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COMMUNITY AND SEPARATE PROPERTY
INTERESTS IN LIFE INSURANCE
PROCEEDS: THE RISK PAYMENT DOCTRINE
IN STATE COURTS AND ITS FEDERAL
ESTATE TAX CONSEQUENCES
The problem of characterization of life insurance proceeds as sepa-
rate or community property when both separate and community funds
have been used to pay premiums has plagued courts in community
property jurisdictions' for over a century. Under the apportionment
doctrine, which was first applied in 1875,2 policy proceeds are charac-
terized as separate and community in proportion to the amount of
premiums paid from separate funds and the amount of premiums paid
from community funds. Under the inception of title doctrine, in use
since 1886,3 policy proceeds are characterized as separate or commu-
nity depending on the character of the funds that were used to pay the
first premium. Neither of these two rules should be applied to term life
insurance, however, for term insurance has no cash value and is essen-
tially renewed with each premium payment. 4 Thus the risk payment
1. The following states comprise the American community property jurisdictions:
Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington.
2. Estate of Webb, Myr. Prob. 93 (Cal. 1875). In Webb one annual premium on
a cash value policy had been 'paid from the insured's separate funds before marriage
and two annual premiums had been paid from community funds after marriage. The
policy beneficiary was the insured's estate. Upon the insured's death, the court divided
the proceeds of the policy, finding one-third to be separate property and two-thirds
community property. For a discussion of Webb see this author's previous Comment,
Community and Separate Property Interests in Life Insurance Proceeds: A Fresh Look,
51 WASH. L. REv. 351, 366-67, 387-88 (1976).
Courts of California and Washington have accepted the apportionment rule for use
with all types of life insurance policies and have made no distinction between cash
value And term policies. See notes 78-86 and accompanying text infra. A cash value
policy accumulates a cash surrender value or equity which can be borrowed against
by the policyowner or which can be received by him if he cancels his policy. A term
insurance policy accumulates little or no cash value. See Parts I & III infra.
3. In re Moseman, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886). In Moseman, life insurance policy
premiums were paid from separate funds before marriage and from community funds
during marriage. The policy beneficiary was the insured's estate. After the insured hus-
band's death, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the policy proceeds were the sep-
arate property of the insured. For a discussion of Moseman, see Comment, supra note
2, at 356-59, 387-88.
The courts of Louisiana, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico apply the inception of
title doctrine to cash value policies and, to varying degrees, have accepted the risk pay-
ment doctrine for use with term insurance. See Part II infra.
4. See Part I infra.
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doctrine 5 has recently been developed 6 in order to deal with situations
in which both separate and community funds have been the source of
premiums on a term life insurance policy. The risk payment doctrine
characterizes term insurance proceeds as separate or community ac-
cording to the source of the last premium payment.
This comment will first examine the decisions of the Louisiana,
Texas, Arizona, Idaho, and New Mexico courts7 in which the risk
payment doctrine has been approved for use with term insurance in
order to determine how well established the doctrine is in each state.
The status of the risk payment doctrine in state courts is important
because "state property rules control the estate taxation of community
property life insurance."8 The estate tax consequences of the risk
payment doctrine will then be considered.
I. THE RISK PAYMENT DOCTRINE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO TERM INSURANCE: AN
INTRODUCTION
Term life insurance has little or no cash value.9 It is a unique type
of property,10 the most important feature being that it exists only by
virtue of each advance premium payment. Protection for the coming
year depends exclusively upon payment of this advance premium. The
length of time the insured has had the policy and the number of pre-
miums previously paid are irrelevant.1 1 If the term passes without the
insured's death, the protection purchased expires without loss. The
insured has had the benefit of protection for the year and the protec-
5. The term "risk payment doctrine" is derived from the concept that life insur-
ance proceeds should be characterized according to the source of funds which paid for
the risk portion of a life insurance policy which is in effect at the insured's death. The
risk portion of a policy is the face value (amount which will be paid upon the in-
sured's death) minus the cash value, if any. For a complete discussion of the risk
payment doctrine, see Comment. supra note 2. at 372-88.
6. See Phillips v. Wellborn, 552 P.2d 471 (N.M. 1976); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 97 Idaho 336, 544 P.2d 294 (1975); Lock v. Lock, 8 Ariz. App. 138. 444
P.2d 163 (1968); Gaethje v. Gaethje, 7 Ariz. App. 544, 441 P.2d 579 (1968); Sher-
man v. Roe, 153 Tex. 1, 262 S.W. 2d 393 (1953); Easterling v. Succession of Lamkin.
211 La. 1089, 31 So. 2d 220 (1947) (dictum). See also Part II infra.
7. See cases cited in note 6 supra.
8. Scott v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 154, 157 (9th Cir. 1967), quoting Thurman.
Federal Estate and Gift Taxation of Community Property Life Insurance, 9 STAN. L.
REV. 239, 245 (1957).
9. See Comment, supra note 2, at 383 n.124.
10. See id. at 352-53.
11. Concerning the right to keep the policy in force after the insured has become
uninsurable, see id., supra note 2. at 369-72.
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tion has been "used up." He must pay another advance premium to
enjoy further protection.
As applied to term insurance, the risk payment doctrine states that
the life insurance proceeds are characterized as separate or commu-
nity according to the source of the last premium payment. 12 Thus, if
the community is paying for insurance protection at the time the in-
sured dies, the insurance proceeds should be characterized as entirely
community property. This rule is consistent with the unique aspect of
term insurance that the current protection is entirely dependent upon
the last premium payment. Premium payments in years gone by are
not considered important. This is in contrast to the necessity of
knowing the sources of past years' premium payments before applying
the inception of title and apportionment rules.
II. THE RISK PAYMENT DOCTRINE AS APPLIED TO
TERM INSURANCE IN STATE COURTS
A. Louisiana
The Louisiana Supreme Court was the first state court to apply the
inception of title rule to cash value life insurance in the 1886 case of
In re Moseman.'3 The Louisiana Supreme Court was also the first court
to accept the risk payment doctrine, which was applied to disability in-
surance in Easterling v. Succession of Lamkin14 in 1947. Dictum in
Easterling indicated that the court considered the risk payment doc-
trine to be the most appropriate method for dealing with term life in-
surance.
In Easterling, the insured husband bought four cash value life in-
surance policies containing disability benefit provisions15 before his
marriage in 1930. The portion of the policy premium which was
charged for the disability benefit was stated in each policy. The in-
sured became disabled in 1939 and died in 1944. His claim for disa-
12. See id.at 372-81.
13. 38 La.Ann. 219 (1886).
14. 211La. 1089,3lSo.2d220(1947).
15. The disability income benefit of each policy provided that if the insured became
permanently disabled before the age of 60, he would receive a certain monthly sum
for the length of his disability. 31 So. 2d at 221. Disability income insurance is often
sold as a "rider" to a life insurance policy. But because it is a type of health insurance,
it is properly analyzed as a distinct product. J. BELTH, LIFE INSURANCE: A CONSUM-
ERS' HANDBOOK 30 (1973); 15 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 53:3 (2d
ed. 1966).
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bility benefits was not allowed during his life but was settled after the
insured's death. The wife was the beneficiary of the life insurance
death proceeds of all four policies and the beneficiary of disability
benefits due but unpaid at the decedent's death under two of the poli-
cies. The other two policies had no provision concerning who was en-
titled to accrued but unpaid disability benefits at the insured's death.
Thus the disability benefits payable under these policies were payable
to the decedent's estate.
The insured's brother and sister argued that the portion of disability
benefits payable to the insured's estate should be characterized as the
insured's separate property, 16 citing previous Louisiana cases in which
the inception of title rule was applied to life insurance policies taken
out before marriage. The surviving spouse argued that the proceeds
were community property.' 7 The trial court held for the widow and
the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed.
The supreme court reasoned that the disability benefits did not fit
into the statutory definition of separate property because the proceeds
were neither brought into the marriage, acquired during the marriage
with separate funds nor acquired by gift or inheritance.' 8 Thus the
proceeds were characterized as community property because of the
statutory definition of community property as that which is not sepa-
rate property.' 9 Most significantly, the court refused to follow the pre-
vious cases in which it had applied the inception of title rule because it
reasoned that disability insurance, which it analogized to term insur-
ance, has no value until the happening of the contingency insured
against.20 This application of the risk payment doctrine to disability
16. If the disability proceeds were characterized as separate property, the brother
and sister would have received them under the Louisiana statutes of intestate succes-
sion. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 912 (West 1972).
17. If the disability benefits were characterized as community property they would
belong to the wife because (1) she owned a half-interest in any community property,
and (2) an intestacy statute provided that a deceased spouse's community interest
passes to the surviving spouse. Id. art. 915.
18. The pertinent parts of the statute read:
The property of married persons is divided into separate and common property.
Separate property is that which either party brings into the marriage, or acquires
during the marriage with separate funds, or by inheritance, or by donation made
to him or her particularly.
Common property is that which is acquired by the husband and wife during
marriage, in any manner different from that above declared.
Id. art 2334.
19. Id.
20. The court stated:
Those decisions have reference only to life insurance. They are not applicable
Vol. 52: 67, 1976
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insurance and the Louisiana Supreme Court's perception of disability
and term life insurance as analogous21 indicate that in Louisiana the
risk payment doctrine should apply to term insurance as well as to
disability insurance.22
Neither before nor after Easterling have Louisiana appellate courts
been called upon to determine the character of term policy proceeds
when premium payments have been made from both separate and
community funds and the insured's estate is the designated benefi-
ciary.2 3 In Succession of Mendoza,24 an intermediate, appellate court
to disability insurance. Life insurance, other than term insurance, has a certain
value during the lifetime of the insured. On the other hand, disability insurance,
like term insurance, has no reserve or cash surrender value, or other actual value
before the happening of the event on which the insurance is payable. In this case,
for example, that part of the premiums which was attributable to the disability
benefits, and which the insured paid previous to his marriage, added nothing to
his estate because the event on which the disability benefits depended did not hap-
pen previous to the marriage. In that respect he did not bring anything of value
into the marriage.
We concede of course that the taking out of the disability insurance previous to
the marriage, instead of taking it out after the marriage, was of some advantage
to the community. . . .But we do not consider these advantages which the com-
munity received by reason of the taking out of the insurance previous to the mar-
riage of the insured sufficient to justify our holding that the fund in contest is an
asset of the separate estate of the insured and not an asset of the community.
31 So. 2d at 223 (emphasis added).
21. Term life insurance and disability income insurance are very similar. In fact,
health insurance, including disability income insurance, is a type of term insurance, for
the health insurance policy is generally a contract for a specific term. After the expira-
tion of the term, the insured may or may not be able to renew the policy, depending
on the policy provisions. H. DENENBERG, R. EILERS, J. MELONE & R. ZELTEN, RISK AND
INSURANCE 311-12 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as DENENBERG); 0. D. DICKER-
SON, HEALTH INSURANCE 425-26, 446-48, 491-93 (3d ed. 1968); C. ELLIOTT & E.
VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 263, 277-78 (1972); S. HUEBNER &
K. BLACK, LIFE INSURANCE 240-41, 546-47 (7th ed. 1969). Furthermore, "[g] roup
disability income insurance has all the characteristics of the group term life insurance."
DENENBERG, supra at 311-12. One author's description of a group disability policy also
applies to term life insurance. "Such protection is peculiarly designed to meet future
needs, is essentially 'instantaneously' available by reason of current employment [or
current premium payments], and [is] not acquired over a time span." Cross, The Com-
munity Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REV. 729, 758-59 n.135 (1974).
22. The court also used an alternate line of reasoning in reaching the conclusion
that the proceeds were community property. It reasoned that the disability benefits were
community property because they were "compensation for the loss of the earning
capacity of the insured." 31 So. 2d at 224. The supreme court clearly stated, however,
that the first line of reasoning, which relied on the statutory definition of separate and
community property alone, was sufficient to justify the holding. Id.
23. Under Louisiana law, if the insured's estate is not the beneficiary then the in-
surance proceeds belong solely to the named beneficiary. See, e.g., T.L. James & Co. v.
Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 847 (La. 1975). In this case the beneficiary of a group
term life insurance policy was a son by the deceased husband's first marriage. Policy
premiums had been paid from both pre- and post-second marriage funds. The court
held that the policy proceeds were the property of the beneficiary and the community's
interest was limited to reimbursement for the increase in the policy's cash value due to
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did apply the inception of title rule to the proceeds of an employer-
provided death benefit plan which, in some respects, is analogous to
group term life insurance. The Louisiana Supreme Court recently over-
ruled Mendoza, however, holding that the apportionment rather than
the inception of title rule should be applied in determining the char-
acter of employer-provided death benefits which are not insurance
contracts. 25 Thus Easterling remains the most authoritative case and
indicates that Louisiana would apply the risk payment doctrine to
term insurance as it already does to disability insurance.
There is one community property principle that has recently been
applied to life insurance in Louisiana that adds support to the Easter-
ling dictum concerning the use of the risk payment doctrine with term
insurance. This principle is that of Louisiana Civil Code Article
240826 which provides that when the separate property of a spouse
has been increased or improved during marriage, the other spouse is
entitled to one-half the value of the increase if such increase is the
result of community expenditures. The Louisiana Supreme Court
recently applied this rule to life insurance and held that when commu-
nity funds are used to pay premiums on a separate policy, the commu-
nity is entitled to be reimbursed for the enhancement in the policy's
value (defined by the court as the cash surrender value) resulting from
premium payments made with community funds.27 The Louisiana
courts should recognize that the principle of Article 2408 is also appli-
cable when the community has paid the last term insurance premium
before death. In that case the proceeds should be community property
community premium payments. Because a term policy was involved there was no in-
crease in cash value and therefore the community had no interest in the policy pro-
ceeds. See also Berry v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 327 So. 2d 521 (La. App. 1976).
in which the court denied the wife any interest in the proceeds of a group term life
insurance policy because the insured husband's sister was the beneficiary. All policy
premiums had been paid from community funds.
For federal estate and gift tax purposes, however, proceeds of a policy on which all
premiums have been paid from community funds are deemed to be community prop-
erty regardless of who is named as beneficiary. Rev. Rul. 48, 1953-1 CUM. BULL. 392,
394; Rev. Rul. 232, 1953-2 CuM. BULL. 268, 270 Example (A)(1). Similarly, upon
the authority of Easterling, for federal estate and gift tax purposes term life insurance
proceeds in Louisiana should be characterized as community property regardless of
who is named as beneficiary if community funds provided the last premium payment.
24. 288 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 1974).
25. See T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 853 n.4 (La. 1976)
(opinion on rehearing).
26. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2408 (West 1972).
27. T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d 834, 847 (La. 1975); Connell v.
Connell. 331 So. 2d 4, 6-7 (La. 1976).
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because the community expenditure has resulted in an increase in the
policy's value from nothing before death to the full face value after
death.
B. Texas
It appears that the Texas Supreme Court accepted the risk payment
doctrine in the 1953 case of Sherman v. Roe.28 In that case, the hus-
band was issued a certificate of insurance under his employer's master
group accidental death policy during his first marriage and the wife of
the earlier marriage had been designated beneficiary. That marriage
was subsequently dissolved and the husband married again. Ten years
after the policy was first issued, three years after the date of his second
marriage, and one year before the husband's death, the face amount
of the policy was increased from $2,000 to $9,000. After having paid
premiums on the insurance policy for approximately six and one-half
years with pre-second-marriage funds and four and one-half years
with community funds, the husband and his second wife were killed in
an aircraft accident. As a result of the accident, it was impossible to
prove whether the death of the husband and wife had been simulta-
neous. The wife was the designated beneficiary of the policy proceeds.
Because the Texas Simultaneous Death Act29 had not yet become
effective as of the date of the accident, there was no presumption ei-
ther of survivorship or of simultaneous death. The Texas Supreme
Court, in reversing the appellate court,30 held that the policy proceeds
were community property. This resulted in the administrator of the
estate of each deceased spouse receiving one-half of the policy pro-
ceeds.
In reaching its conclusion that the proceeds of the policy were
community property rather than separate property, the court reasoned
as follows: 31
[T] he insurance was maintained by [community] payments and by
28. 153 Tex. 1, 262 S.W.2d 393 (1953).
29. Originally enacted in ch. 196, [1951] Tex. Laws 322, the current statute is
found in TEX. PROB. CODE § 47 (Supp. 1975-76).
30. Sherman v. Roe, 258 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953). The lower court had
held that the proceeds were the separate property of the husband because the policy
provided that the proceeds were payable to the wife only "if surviving the Employee
[husband], and otherwise to the estate of the Employee [husband] ." 258 S.W.2d at
864.
31. 262 S.W.2d at 397.
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[the husband's] continuing to work as employee of the company in-
sured by the group policy. The greater part of the insurance was pro-
cured after [the husband and wife] were married. Whatever rights to
the proceeds of the insurance might accrue to [the husband] as his
separate property on account of his having procured the insurance for
$2,000 before his marriage to [the wife] or by his payments of pre-
miums before his marriage to her in our opinion passed to the commu-
nity when, after his marriage to [her], he paid the premiums out of
community funds, made her the beneficiary, and increased the amount
of the insurance to $9,000. Under this state of facts the ownership of
the proceeds of the certificate is to be determined in the same way as if
the certificate had been issued after [the husband and wife] were mar-
ried and all premiums paid out of community funds.
The first factor considered by the court, that the insurance policy
was maintained by community payments after marriage, is the most
important and indicates that the Texas Supreme Court applied the risk
payment doctrine. The court reasoned that the premium payments of
$42.15 (46% of the total premiums paid) over the six and one-half
years previous to marriage (65% of the time the policy was in force)
did not create any vested right to policy proceeds in the husband's
separate estate. Such pre-marriage premium payments had no effect
on whether the policy would be in force during the marriage, for if
payments had not been continued during marriage, the insurance pro-
tection would have expired. Thus the insurance proceeds were attrib-
utable not to any separate premium payments but rather to commu-
nity payments made during the second marriage.
The remaining two factors the court relied on are less significant
and can be dismissed. Because the policy's face amount was increased
from $2,000 to $9,000 after three years of marriage and one year
before death, the court reasoned that the "greater part" of the insur-
ance proceeds were acquired after marriage and therefore the entire
proceeds should be community property. It is unclear how such a
"greater part" test can be applied in future cases. There is no indica-
tion how much of an increase must occur before the increase can be
labled a "greater part" of the proceeds. Furthermore, this reasoning is
weak because the court treated the $2,000 as negligible. Two-ninths
(22%) of the proceeds of a policy, however, is not a negligible
amount.
32
32. It is common for group term life insurance protection to increase as an employee
Vol. 52: 67, 1976
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The final factor considered important by the court was that the
beneficiary of the life insurance policy was the wife. It is difficult to
understand, however, that making the wife the beneficiary would lend
any support to the contention that the proceeds were community
property, for just the opposite conclusion is required by Texas law.
"[I] t has been rather thoroughly established in Texas . . . that the
proceeds of a policy on the husband's life payable to the wife as bene-
ficiary upon the death of the insured belong to the wife as her separate
property."33
After concluding that the ownership of the proceeds should be de-
termined as if the insurance had been issued after marriage and all
premiums paid from community funds, the court used two alternative
lines of reasoning to conclude that half the proceeds should belong to
each spouse's estate. First, the statutory presumption, that upon disso-
lution of the community all effects of the husband and wife are com-
munity property, could not be rebutted because it was impossible to
determine in what order the deaths occurred. Thus the court reasoned
that "the proceeds . . . should, by reason of the statute . . . , be
deemed community effects. '3 4 As an alternative to the use of the stat-
utory presumption, the court said that even if the proceeds were pay-
able to the husband's separate estate, the proceeds would still be
community property.35 This reasoning was based on the rule that if
the beneficiary of a community property life insurance policy is the
insured spouse's estate, the proceeds are community property.3 6 Pro-
fessor Huie and other commentators have suggested that the case indi-
cates that the Texas Supreme Court has accepted the risk payment
rule.37
gains seniority and as his salary increases. Additional examples of group term life in-
surance coverage increasing over the years can be found in the following cases: Berry
v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 327 So. 2d 521, 522 (La. App. 1976) (group term
life insurance increased from $33,000 to $49,500); T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery,
332 So. 2d 834, 847 (La. 1975) (group term life insurance increased from $15,000 to
$22,500); Lock v. Lock, 8 Ariz. App. 138, 444 P.2d 163, 165 (1968) (group term life
insurance increased from $12,500 to $17,500); Polk v. Polk, 228 Cal. App. 2d 763, 39
Cal. Rptr. 824, 827 (1964) (group term life insurance increased from $3,300 to
$6,500).
33. Warthan v. Haynes, 155 Tex. 413, 288 S.W.2d 481, 484 (1956).
34. 262 S.W.2d at 397.
35. Id. at 398-99.
36. Id.
37. Professor Huie stated:
When term insurance is being renewed periodically, the transaction can properly
be analyzed as the formation of a new contract as each renewal occurs. If that
was the case in Sherman v. Roe, as it seems to have been, the court was entirely
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Ten years after Sherman v. Roe, another significant Texas life in-
surance case, McCurdy v. McCurdy,3 8 was decided. In McCurdy, the
deceased husband had paid premiums on two life insurance policies
for several years before marriage and one and one-half years after
marriage until his death. His estate was the beneficiary under each
policy. One policy had been "converted" a month before the insured's
death, but the nature of the conversion was not indicated. The hus-
band's executor listed the proceeds as part of the husband's separate
estate and the wife brought an action against the executor seeking a
determination of the character of the proceeds. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court's holding that the proceeds should be charac-
terized as separate property and that the community was entitled to a
reimbursement, without interest, of the premiums it had paid. Mc-
Curdy was approved by the Texas Supreme Court's refusing a writ of
error to the lower court.
In light of the Sherman and McCurdy opinions, the rules for deter-
mination of separate and community interest in life insurance policies
in Texas seem to be clear. The court in Sherman said that if the policy
is a term policy, then the character of the proceeds is to be determined
by the source of the funds (community or separate) from which the
last premiums came, where such premiums are responsible for the
insurance being in force at the decedent's death. Although the court in
the McCurdy case did not designate precisely what type of life insur-
ance policies was before it, it is assumed that they were of a type
which built cash value, or the court would have felt constrained to
follow Sherman.39 Therefore, for cash value policies in Texas, the rule
governing the characterization of life insurance proceeds when both
separate and community funds have paid policy premiums appears to
be the inception of title rule.40
justified in treating the contract in controversy as one that was formed during the
* marriage and paid for entirely with ... community funds.
Huie, Community Property and Life Insurance-Substantive Aspects-Developments
in Texas, 2 TEXAS INST. 104. 128 (1957). See also S. SCOVILLE, COMMUNITY PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN LIFE INSURANCE 103 (1969); Note, 18 Sw. L.J. 521 n.2 (1964); Note, 42
TEXAS L. REV. 747, 750 & n.24 (1964).
38. 372 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963, writ ref'd).
39. Since Sherman no Texas appellate court has faced the question of how to
characterize proceeds of a term life insurance policy when premiums have been paid
from both separate and community funds and the beneficiary is the insured's estate.
Since McCurdy the same question regarding cash value insurance has arisen only once.
See Pritchard v. Snow, 530 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). The Pritchard court
followed the McCurdy holding.
40. Although the risk payment doctrine or the inception of title rule may charac-
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C. Arizona
Although the Arizona Supreme Court adopted the inception of title
rule for cash value policies in 1939,41 the Arizona Court of Appeals
explicitly accepted the risk payment doctrine for term insurance in
two 1968 cases. In Gaethje v. Gaethje,42 the husband was issued a
certificate of insurance under his employer's group term life insurance
policy in 1947 during his second marriage. Presumably the premiums
for the policy were paid monthly. In 1952 he divorced his second wife
and then remarried her in 1953. After the remarriage, the insured
changed the policy beneficiary from his wife to his son. The divorce
decree contained no reference to the policy. The husband died in
1966 while married to his second wife and covered by the policy.
The widow instituted an action against the beneficiary to recover
the policy proceeds, alleging that the decedent's change of beneficiary
from the widow to the son was an invalid transfer of community prop-
erty beyond the scope of the husband's authority without his wife's
consent. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
widow, holding that a gift of community property life insurance policy
proceeds through a beneficiary designation was entirely void as to the
community's interest in the policy if the wife had not consented to the
beneficiary designation. That community interest was determined by
application of the apportionment rule to be approximately 97% of
the proceeds, or about $5,800.
On appeal the Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the trial court,
terize policy proceeds as community property, the surviving spouse will not necessarily
share in the proceeds. If the beneficiary of a life insurance policy is a third party, such
as a child, parent or friend, the surviving spouse cannot void the beneficiary designa-
tion as to her one-half interest in community property proceeds unless such designa-
tion is an act of either actual or constructive fraud. Factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether the beneficiary designation is constructively fraudulent are "the rela-
tionship of the parties, whether special circumstances tended to justify the gift, and
whether the community funds used for such purpose were reasonably in proportion to
the community assets remaining." Givens v. Girard Life Ins. Co. of America, 480
S.W.2d 421, 426 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972, writ ref'd, n.r.e.). A prima facie case of con-
structive fraud is presented if "life insurance was purchased with community funds for
the benefit of an unrelated person." Id. In considering whether the gift of community
funds is reasonable in proportion to the amount of community assets retained by the
surviving spouse, courts emphasize the amount of insurance proceeds rather than the
amount of premiums which resulted in those proceeds. See, e.g., Murphy v. Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co., 498 S.W.2d 278, 282 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973, writ ref'd, n.r.e.) See
generally Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. Sanders, 525 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. 1975).
41. Rothman v. Rumbeck, 54 Ariz. 443, 96 P.2d 755 (1939) (premiums paid from
separate funds before marriage and community funds after marriage).
42. 7 Ariz. App. 544,441 P.2d 579 (1968).
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holding that the uncorroborated affidavit of the wife which stated that
she had not consented to the beneficiary designation was insufficient
to overcome the statutory presumption that she had consented to such
designation. Therefore, granting a summary judgment in the wife's
favor on the basis of the affidavit alone was improper.
After explaining the circumstances under which the husband may
make a valid gift of community insurance proceeds to a third party,43
the court clarified the law concerning the interest of the community in
the policy when community premium payments had followed separate
premium payments. First, the court noted that term life insurance pol-
icies were unique and had no value until the death of the insured. It
then refused to apply the precedent of Rothman v. Rumbeck,44 the
1939 case in which the Arizona Supreme Court adopted the inception
of title rule. Rothman was distinguished by the Gaethje court because
it presumably involved a cash value life insurance policy rather than
term life insurance. 45 Finally, as a result of the unique character of
term insurance, the court felt it did not have to deal with the status of
the policy after the divorce: 46
Community funds paid for all of the coverage that resulted in these
particular proceeds. The fact that the husband's separate estate paid a
premium for a risk long since expired without loss should not give his
separate estate any vested interest in these proceeds.
Gaethje is significant because the Arizona appellate court, unlike
the Texas Supreme Court in Sherman v. Roe 15 years earlier, relied
exclusively on the unique character of term life insurance to justify
treating it differently than cash value insurance. It should also be
noted that the Arizona court did not need to accept the risk payment
doctrine in this case; the application of the inception of title rule,
which was already the established doctrine in the state, would have
led to the same conclusion, i.e., that the proceeds were community
property because the first policy premiums were paid with community
funds before the divorce.
43. The court adopted the view that if the wife were left with as much in value as
one-half of the total community property upon the husband's death, then the "gift" by
the husband's designation of a third party as the beneficiary of a community life in-
surance policy was valid. Otherwise, there would be constructive fraud upon the wife
and the designation would be ineffective to the extent of such constructive fraud. 441
P.2d at 584.
44. 54 Ariz. 443, 96 P.2d 755 (1939).
45. See Part III infra for further discussion of cash value life insurance.
46. 441 P.2d at 585 (emphasis in original).
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Two months after the Gaethje decision, the Arizona Court of Ap-
peals again explicitly relied on the risk payment doctrine in Lock v.'
Lock.47 In this case, the husband began paying premiums on a group
term life insurance policy with community funds during his first mar-
riage. In 1961 the husband and his wife were divorced. The property
settlement accompanying the divorce provided that the husband main-
tain insurance on himself and that the proceeds of such insurance be
placed in an irrevocable trust for the benefit of the children. Soon
after the divorce the husband married his second wife and in 1962 he
changed the beneficiary of his group term policy to his second wife
and let another of his policies lapse. He died in 1963. His first wife
sued on behalf of herself and her minor children to recover the
amount of proceeds which according to the terms of the property set-
tlement agreement should have been deposited into the trust upon the
husband's death. The first wife and her children unsuccessfully ad-
vanced several arguments to sustain their right to recovery. One argu-
ment was that because the group term life insurance policy was owned
by the community of the husband and his first wife during their mar-
riage, it continued to be owned by them as tenants in common after
their divorce; thus, the husband should be unable to designate a third
party as the policy beneficiary without the consent of his first wife.
The court rejected this argument, however, and, quoting Gaethje, rea-
soned that "the premiums paid which resulted in this policy being in
effect on the date of [the husband's] death were not paid from com-
munity funds as they were paid after the divorce. '48
Lock firmly establishes that the Arizona courts have accepted the
risk payment doctrine. The fact that the court ruled directly against
the luckless wife and her three minor children indicates the strength of
the risk payment doctrine in Arizona. Apparently, however, the incep-
tion of title rule still governs the characterization of cash value policy
proceeds in Arizona, for recently the Arizona Court of Appeals fol-
lowed the Rothman inception of title rule in a situation dealing with a
cash value insurance policy.49
47. 8 Ariz. App. 138, 444 P.2d 163 (1968).
48. 444 P.2d at 169.
49. Everson v. Everson, 24 Ariz. App. 239, 537 P.2d 624, 628-29 (1975) (cash
value policy "purchased" before marriage is husband's separate property), citing Perry
v. Perry, 18 Ariz. App. 299, 300, 501 P.2d 568, 569 (1972).
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D. Idaho
The Idaho Supreme Court recently adopted the risk payment doc-
trine for use with term insurance in Travelers Insurance Co. v.
Johnson.50 In this case, after the husband and his first wife were di-
vorced, the husband received a group term life insurance policy as an
incident of his employment and named his ex-wife as beneficiary of
the policy. The first nine months' premiums were paid from his sepa-
rate funds before his second marriage. He then married his second
wife, paid premiums on the policy with community funds for ten and
one-half years, and died. Upon the insured's death, both the insured's
ex-wife, who was the named beneficiary, and his widow claimed the
$10,000 policy proceeds.
The facts before the trial court were stipulated, including the fact
that although the widow was aware of the insurance policy, she had
had the impression that she was the policy's beneficiary, and therefore
had not consented to community premium payments for a policy
which named a third party as beneficiary. The trial court apportioned
the proceeds between the two women in a unique manner based on
the amount of time each had had an insurable interest in the decedent.
Before the Idaho Supreme Court, however, neither woman argued
in favor of the trial court's result. The ex-wife, who was the benefi-
ciary under the policy, argued that the inception of title rule should
govern and therefore the proceeds should be characterized as separate
property with the widow's interest limited to recovery of only one-half
the community premiums paid. The widow argued that because pre-
mium payments had been made from community funds the commu-
nity obtained "vested" rights in the proceeds. This is the rationale be-
hind the apportionment doctrine.51 Alternatively, the widow argued
that she was entitled to one-half the policy proceeds.
After considering both the policy questions and the legal questions,
the court rejected the rationales behind both the inception of title and
the apportionment rules. The court recognized that "[t] he policy im-
plications of this case present problems of great conceptual difficul-
ty" 52 and that their resolution required determining the extent to
50. 97 Idaho 336, 544 P.2d 294 (1975).
51. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
52. 544 P.2d at 296.
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which term insurance should be controlled by the contractual terms of
the insurance policy rather than by community property law.
The court found two dominant policy concerns which arise out of
this attempt at balancing the policy's contractual terms with commu-
nity property law. The first concern is the protection of the surviving
spouse from the decedent's dissipation of all the community property
through the medium of life insurance. The second concern involves
the wish of a married insured to utilize life insurance to provide for
dependent relatives other than his or her spouse. As a policy matter,
the court was unwilling to resolve the conflict between these two inter-
ests by favoring one over the other. Therefore, on policy grounds the
court rejected the inception of title rule, which would have allowed
the decedent husband in this instance to have given all of the life in-
surance proceeds to a third person, stating: "Convenient as this
proposition may appear, it all but avoids the central policy considera-
tions." 53
Similarly, the court refused to accept Washington's apportionment
rule5 4 because to do so would mean that if the insured spouse names a
third party as the beneficiary of a community property life insurance
policy without permission of the noninsured spouse, the noninsured
spouse could prevent the transfer of any funds to the beneficiary. In
comparison the California apportionment rule,55 which does allow the
transfer of one-half the conmunity interest to the named beneficiary,
more closely follows a rationale which balances both policy concerns.
The court also addressed two legal questions. The first concerned
the interest which a community acquires in a term life insurance
policy by virtue of premium payments being made from community
funds. The court rejected the inception of title rule because it "leaves
unanswered the question of what interest results from the use of com-
munity assets to pay the premiums. '56 The reasoning behind the ap-
portionment rule, that through premium payments made from com-
munity funds the community obtains a vested right in the proceeds,
was also explicitly rejected.57 The court reasoned that no vested in-
terest in term insurance policy proceeds arises by virtue of community
53. Id.
54. See note 103 infra.
55. Id.
56. 544 P.2d at 296.
57. Id. at 296-97.
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premium payments because after discontinuing such payments there
is nothing remaining in which the "vested right" can claim an inter-
est.58 Similarly, there is nothing in which to claim an interest if the
spouses divorce because the policy has value only upon the insured's
death. Therefore the court held that at the death of the insured the
proceeds were community property.59
The second legal question addressed by the court concerned the
extent to which an insured spouse can make a valid gift of community
property life insurance proceeds through a beneficiary designation to a
third party without the consent of the noninsured spouse. The court
reviewed the laws of Louisiana, Washington, California, and Texas
concerning the gifts of community property life insurance proceeds. It
then discussed the earlier Idaho case of Anderson v. Idaho Mutual
Benefit Association.60 In Anderson it was stated that an insured spouse
cannot make a valid gift of insurance proceeds through a beneficiary
designation on a community life insurance policy without the nonin-
sured spouse's consent. The court also stated that if such a gift were
made, it was voidable by the noninsured spouse as to his or her one-
half interest in the proceeds. Relying on Anderson, the court held that
if the insured spouse names a beneficiary other than the noninsured
spouse, and if the noninsured spouse has not consented to such a ben-
eficiary designation, then the noninsured spouse can recover half of
the community policy proceeds. 61
58. See Comment, supra note 2, at 373-74 & n.97.
59. The court stated:
Since the policy in the case at bar is a term life insurance policy, we need not de-
termine if a property interest in that policy "vested" at the time of issuance or at
the time when premiums were paid from community funds. As a term policy it
had no value except in the event of the death of the insured. It is enough to hold
that at the death of the insured a community property interest in the proceeds
became vested in the surviving spouse.
544 P.2d at 298 (citation omitted).
60. 77 Idaho 373, 292 P.2d 760 (1956).
61. The court stated:
We hold only that when a insurance policy is issued on the life of a married per-
son without the knowledge or consent of the other spouse and (1) someone other
than the insured's spouse is the named beneficiary; and (2) no consideration passes
between the insured and the named beneficiary; and (3) the premiums are paid
with community assets; and (4) the insured dies; a community property interest
exists as to one-half of the proceeds of the policy.
544 P.2d at 298. Although the language of the last phrase seems to indicate that only
one-half the proceeds are community property, in order to be consistent with the rest
of the opinion the last phrase should read: "a community property interest of the sur-
viving spouse exists as to one-half of the proceeds of the policy." Whatever the language
intended, however, the holding is that a spouse can make a gift of one-half the pro-
ceeds of a community property life insurance policy.
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In holding that the risk payment doctrine was applicable to term
insurance and that an insured spouse can give away only one-half of
community property proceeds without the consent of the noninsured
spouse, the court resolved the policy questions that it had considered
to be important. The surviving spouse is protected because he or she is
entitled to one-half the proceeds of the policy. In addition, the wish of
the insured spouse to make provision for dependent relatives can be
fulfilled to the extent of the other half of the proceeds. The court rea-
soned that there was no reason to prohibit a spouse "from giving away
an amount which can be no more than half of property accumulated
during marriage through the medium of life insurance when we permit
him to do so through the law of descent and distribution. '62
Johnson was a well-reasoned case and was the first opinion in
which a court fully considered both the legal and policy considera-
tions associated with the risk payment doctrine and its alternatives.63
When other state courts consider the risk payment doctrine, they
should follow the lead of the Johnson court and examine the same
legal and policy questions before making their decision.
E. New Mexico
The most recent acceptance of the risk payment doctrine was by
the New Mexico Supreme Court in the decision of Phillips v. Well-
born.64 Previously, the court had accepted the inception of title rule
and applied it in two instances in which premiums had been paid from
both separate and community funds. 65 In neither of the previous
cases, however, had the court explicitly stated whether the policy
under consideration was a cash value or a term policy.66
62. Id.
63. Although undoubtedly influenced by the two 1968 Arizona Court of Appeals
cases in which Arizona accepted the risk payment doctrine, the Idaho Supreme Court
seemed to be striking out on its own, for it cited only one of the two Arizona cases,
Gaethje v. Gaethje, 7 Ariz. App. 544, 441 P.2d 579 (1968). Additionally, that Arizona
case was cited only for the narrow proposition that a term policy has no value except
at death. It was the Idaho court's own conclusion that the risk payment doctrine is the
most sensible approach to take when dealing with term insurance.
64. 552 P.2d 471 (N.M. 1976).
65. Hickson v. Herrmann, 77 N.M. 683, 427 P.2d 36 (1967) (premium payments
on a child's policy made from community funds during marriage and separate funds
after divorce); In re White's Estate, 43 N.M. 202, 89 P.2d 36 (1939) (premium pay-
ments on the husband's U.S. government policy made from separate funds while single
and community funds after marriage).
66. The United States government policy in White would have been a one-year
renewable and convertible term policy unless it had been converted to a cash value
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In Phillips, the insured husband took out two term life insurance
policies during his first marriage, paying premiums on them with
community funds for six years on one policy and two years on the
other. After a divorce from his first wife, in which neither of the poli-
cies was specifically awarded to either party, the insured was single for
over a year before marrying his second wife. Eighteen months after
his second marriage the insured died. Presumably the sources of pre-
mium payments were separate funds when he was single and commu-
nity funds during his second marriage. After the insured's death, the
second wife sought declaratory relief against the beneficiaries under
the policies and against the insured's first wife in order to determine
the ownership of the proceeds of the policies. The trial court awarded
all proceeds to the beneficiaries.
The first wife appealed the trial court's decision, contending that
she had a one-half interest in each policy as a tenant in common with
the insured for two reasons.67 The first was the statutory provision
that "[t] he failure to divide the property on dissolution of marriage
shall not affect the property rights of either the husband or wife
.... -"68 She also argued that the court should follow its previously
accepted rule that life insurance policies purchased with community
funds and which are undisposed in the divorce decree are owned by
the former spouses as tenants in common after the divorce.6 9 The
beneficiaries of the policies, the insured's parents, argued that they
policy. See Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 105, § 2, 40 Stat. 398. Eleven years after White
the United States Supreme Court held that proceeds of a military life insurance policy
similar to the policy in White are the insured spouse's separate property even if all
premiums have been paid from community funds. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655
(1950). See also Rev. Rul. 56-603, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 601. Wissner may thus give
the New Mexico Supreme Court a reason for distinguishing the White facts from a
future case that may come before it.
The policy in Hickson was probably a cash value policy because the husband testi-
fied that one reason he volunteered to maintain the child's policy after divorce was so
the policy could be used for the child's education. 427 P.2d at 38. A term policy would
build up little or no cash value that could be used for the child's education. At the
time of divorce in Hickson, however, the policy had not yet begun to accumulate cash
value. Id. In any event, the court in Phillips stated: "If Hickson v. Herrmann did deal
with term insurance, which cannot be ascertained from the facts, it is overruled to
the extent described herein." 552 P.2d at 473 n. 1.
67. The original action involved determining the ownership of four life insurance
policies, including the two term policies. The only question raised on appeal was
whether the first wife had any interest in the term policies. 552 P.2d at 472. The court
was not presented with the issue of determining the extent of the surviving spouse's
ability to void the transfer of community property proceeds otherwise payable to a
third party as policy beneficiary.
68. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-22 (Supp. 1975).
69. 552 P.2d at 472.
Vol. 52: 67, 1976
Community Property Life Insurance
should be entitled to the proceeds because (1) term life insurance is
not property but a contingent contractual right, (2) it would be ineq-
uitable for a former wife to make a claim against insurance proceeds
when she had made none during the divorce and made no subsequent
premium payments, and (3) due to the unique nature of term insur-
ance, previous premium payments made during a former marriage do
not necessarily make the term life insurance policies community prop-
erty after divorce.
In its analysis, the court first distinguished the previous cases which
had held that community property life insurance policies not disposed
of in the divorce decree are owned by the former spouses as tenants in
common because those cases had dealt with cash value insurance
rather than term insurance.70 The court then explained the nature of
term insurance, stating that it had no cash surrender value and that
the policy could be terminated at any time by merely refusing to make
premium payments. Finally, the court concluded that when a term life
insurance policy is undisposed in the divorce decree, the former
spouses hold the policy as tenants in common only until the end of the
period for which the last community premium was paid.7'
The Phillips case is thus somewhat similar to the Arizona Court of
Appeals decision of Lock v. Lock.7 2 Both cases involved a former wife
suing for partition of the proceeds of a term insurance policy on the
70. Id. at 472-73. The prior cases which were distinguished are Harris v. Harris,
83 N.M. 441, 493 P.2d 407 (1972), and Hickson v. Herrmann, 77 N.M 683, 427 P.2d
36(1967).
71. The court stated:
Unless otherwise ordered by the court in the dissolution of marriage and the prop-
erty settlement, the divorced spouses have an equal interest as tenants in common
in a term life insurance policy until such time as the term determined by the last
premium paid by community funds comes to an end. Here, [the insured's term life
insurance] policies were paid in quarterly installments. Thus, [the first wife's] in-
terest in those policies terminated on the date where the quarter ended for which
the premium payment had been made prior to the dissolution of the marriage.
When [the insured] died, [the first wife's] interest in the policies had long since
ended. To hold otherwise could result in manifest injustice. For example, if we
were to adopt [the first wife's] position, a wife of short duration could theoret-
ically assert her interest against her ex-husband's estate twenty or more years later
merely because the policy was taken out during their marriage and one premium
was paid with community funds. Further complexities would arise should the
husband in this hypothetical example have remarried once or twice before his
death. The test formulated above obviates such problems.
552 P.2d at 473 (footnotes omitted). Thus the supreme court accepted the second and
third arguments of the beneficiaries. Coincidentally, the same reasoning and result were
suggested by a commentator several months prior to the Phillips decision. Comment,
supra note 2, at 380 n.1 16.
72. See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
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ex-husband's life under the theory that the policy was held by the
former spouses as tenants in common after a divorce in which the
policy was undisposed. One difference between the two courts' reason-
ing, however, is that the analysis of the court in Phillips was much
more sophisticated. In Lock, the court merely asserted that because
post-divorce funds paid for all of the coverage that was in effect at the
former husband's death, the previous community had no interest in
the proceeds. In Phillips, however, the court actually indicated the
moment at which the community interest ended. It said that if the policy
is undisposed in the divorce decree and if no premiums are paid after
divorce, then the former spouses would have a common interest in the
proceeds if the insured spouse died before the end of the period for
which a payment had been made, plus any applicable grace period. 73
Once a subsequent premium is paid with separate funds after divorce,
however, the former community has no interest in the proceeds. This
rather sophisticated analysis and the willingness of the New Mexico
Supreme Court to establish a rule broader than that required by the
facts of the case indicate the court's confidence in the viability of the
risk payment doctrine.
As a result of Phillips, it can be expected that when New Mexico
courts face the question of the characterization of term life insurance
proceeds where separate funds have paid for premiums before mar-
riage and community funds during marriage and the insured dies
during marriage, the proceeds will be held to be community property.
It is unknown, however, how much of the community proceeds could
be given to a nonspouse beneficiary who is designated without the
consent of both spouses. Although a New Mexico statute74 on its face
73. The court stated: "If [the insured] had not continued paying his premiums.
[the first wife's] interest would have continued through the policy's 31 day grace
period." 552 P.2d at 473 n.4.
74. The pertinent part of the statute reads:
A. Except as provided in subsections B and C of this section, either spouse alone
has full power to manage, control, dispose of and encumber the entire community
personal property.
B. Where only one [1] spouse is:
(1) named in a document evidencing ownership of community personal prop-
erty; or
(2) named or designated in a written agreement between that spouse and a
third party as having sole authority to manage, control, dispose of or encumber
the community personal property which is described in or which is the subject of
the agreement, whether the agreement was executed prior to or after July 1, 1973;
only the spouse so named may manage, control, dispose of or encumber the com-
munity personal property described in such a document evidencing ownership or
in such a written agreement.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4A-8 (Supp. 1975).
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seems to allow such a gift, it may be judicially limited in a manner
similar to the methods in which the Texas,75 Arizona 76 or Idaho77
courts have limited gifts of community property life insurance pro-
ceeds.
F. California, Washington and Nevada
Although the risk payment doctrine has not been adopted in three
community property jurisdictions, it may yet be. The apportionment
rule has been accepted as the law of California since 1931,78 but the
question of its applicability has never been presented to the state su-
preme court. The doctrine originated and has developed exclusively in
the lower state courts.7 9 Thus, although the apportionment rule has
been applied to term insurance by the intermediate appellate courts
and the risk payment doctrine has been rejected,8 0 it is unknown
whether the California Supreme Court would accept the risk payment
doctrine.
The Washington Supreme Court has applied the apportionment rule
to both cash value81 and term insurance82 policies. In Small v. Barty-
75. See note 40 supra.
76. See note 43 supra.
77. See notes 60-61 and accompanying text supra.
78. Modern Woodmen of America v. Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 P. 754 (1931)(premiums paid from separate funds before marriage and community funds after
marriage).
79. See, e.g., Polk v. Polk, 228 Cal. App. 2d 763, 39 Cal. Rptr. 824 (1964) (group
term policy premiums paid from community funds before abandonment and separate
funds after abandonment); Gettman v. City of Los Angeles, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862,
197 P.2d 817 (1948) (employee death benefit plan premiums paid from funds of first
community and separate funds before remarriage and funds of second community
after remarriage); McBride v. McBride, 11 Cal. App. 2d 521, 54 P.2d 480 (1936)
(premiums paid from funds of first community before divorce and second community
after remarriage); Estate of Webb, Myr. Prob. 93 (Cal. 1875) (cash value policy
premiums paid from separate funds before marriage and community funds after mar-
riage).
80. See P61k v. Polk, 228 Cal. App. 2d 763, 39 Cal. Rptr. 824, 834-38 (1964)
(discussion of applicability of apportionment rule to group term life insurance); Gett-
man v. City of Los Angeles, 87 Cal. App. 2d 862, 197 P.2d 817, 819 (1948) (discus-
sion of applicability of apportionment rule to employee death benefit plan and rejec-
tion of risk payment doctrine); McBride v. McBride, 11 Cal. App. 2d 521, 54 P.2d
480, 481 (1936) (discussion of applicability of apportionment rule to assessment life
insurance policy and rejection of risk payment doctrine); Modern Woodmen of Amer-
ica v. Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 299 P. 754, 754-55 (1931) (discussion of applicability
of apportionment rule to mutual benefit certificate and rejection of risk payment doc-
trine).
81. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 35 Wn. 2d 364, 212 P.2d 1022 (1949) (cash value
policy premiums paid from separate funds before marriage and community funds
after marriage); In re Coffey's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938) (policy
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zel,83 where the apportionment rule was first applied to term insur-
ance, however, the spouse of the decedent argued the apportionment
doctrine rather than the risk payment doctrine, for she was content
with the characterization of 86% of the proceeds as community prop-
erty through the application of the apportionment rule.84 The dis-
senting chief justice argued that the risk payment doctrine should have
been applied.85 Since Small, the risk payment doctrine has been
argued, but not accepted, in two subsequent cases. 86
premiums paid from separate funds before marriage and community funds after mar-
riage).
82. Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wn. 2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947) (group term insurance
policy premiums paid from separate funds before marriage and community funds
after marriage).
83. Id.
84. In Small, the plaintiff surviving spouse sued the beneficiary of the policy, the
deceased spouse's child by a former marriage, for the community portion of the pro-
ceeds. Because 13 policy premiums had been paid before the decedent's marriage from
his separate funds and 79 premiums had been paid during marriage from community
funds, the trial court declared 79/92 (86%) of the proceeds to be community property.
Before the Washington Supreme Court. the beneficiary argued for the application of
the inception of title rule and the surviving spouse argued for the apportionment rule.
See Brief for Appellant, Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wn. 2d 176, 177 P.2d 391 (1947) and
Brief for Respondent, Small v. Bartyzel, supra. The plaintiff surviving spouse men-
tioned the risk payment doctrine, which would allow recovery of the entire proceeds.
only in a portion of one paragraph of her brief in order to indicate that she should be
able to recover at least her proportionate interest in the group term policy proceeds.
Brief for Respondent at 29-30, Small v. Bartyzel, supra.
85. ChiefJustice Mallery concluded:
The full value for all the monthly premiums except the last one was received by
way of the protection enjoyed by the assured during the periods for which they
were paid ....
• . . Hence, no premium has any significance except the last premium, which
was paid during coverture, and for this reason the avails of the policy are com-
munity property.
Small v. Bartyzel, 27 Wn. 2d 176, 185, 177 P.2d 391, 395-96 (1947) (dissenting
opinion).
86. Chase v. Chase, 74 Wn. 2d 253, 444 P.2d 145 (1968); Stephen v. Gallion. 5
Wn. App. 747, 491 P.2d 238 (1971). It is apparent that the risk payment doctrine was
argued in these cases only when one examines the briefs of counsel. See Brief for
Appellant at 11-23, Chase v. Chase, supra; Brief for Respondent at 2-8. Stephen v.
Gallion, supra. Chase involved a disability policy on which premiums had been paid
for seven years during marriage. At the time the insured and his spouse were divorced.
the insured was in the hospital as a result of heart trouble but did not realize he was
permanently disabled and therefore entitled to benefits under a group disability insur-
ance plan. Later, he was awarded a lump sum in settlement by the insurance company
for his disability. Because the divorce decree had not mentioned the insurance policy.
the court held that the former spouses held the policy and settlement obtained under
the policy as tenants in common.
Stephen involved a group term life insurance policy on which monthly premiums
had been paid for 15 years during marriage. The insured and his spouse then divorced
on December 5, 1968 and the insured died slightly over a month later, on January 7,
1969. The divorce decree did not mention the policy. At least one monthly premium
on the policy was paid after the divorce and before the insured's death. The court
held that on the date of the husband's death, the policy was held by the former spouses
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The Nevada Supreme Court has never faced the question of whether
the inception of title, apportionment or risk payment rule should be
applied when insurance premiums have been paid partly with separate
funds and partly with community funds.
III. THE RISK PAYMENT DOCTRINE AND ITS
APPLICATION TO CASH VALUE INSURANCE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO ITS POTENTIAL USE IN
STATE COURTS
The risk payment doctrine should be applied to policies which have
cash value as well as to term insurance policies. Cash value policies
"may be considered to be a combination of decreasing term insurance
(the pure protection element) and an increasing savings or investment
element .... ,,s7 The risk payment doctrine should be applied to the
risk or protection component of the cash value policy, while the cash
value portion should be divided between the separate and community
estates.88 The division of the cash value can be based either on the
as tenants in common and that therefore the former wife was entitled to recover one-
half the policy proceeds from the sole beneficiary, the insured's minor daughter.
87. Williams, Contracts---Whole Life and Endowment, in LIFE AND HEALTH IN-
sURANcE HANDBOOK 66, 70 (3d ed. D. Gregg & V. Lucas 1973). This concept is more
fully developed in Comment, supra note 2 at 353-55, 381 and n.120.
88. The application of the risk payment rule to cash value insurance can easily be
illustrated. Assume a single person purchased a $10,000 nonparticipating whole life
policy and paid five annual premiums before marriage and fifteen annual premiums
after marriage. Upon the death of the insured 20 years after paying the first premium,
the cash value may be $2,000. If the cash value would be apportioned according to
the nature of the property used to pay the premiums, one-fourth (5/20) would be
characterized as separate property and three-fourths (15/20) would be characterized
as community property. The risk portion of the policy, i.e., the face value ($10,000)
less the cash value ($2,000), $8,000, would be characterized according to whether
separate or community funds were used to pay the final premium. For a more detailed
discussion of the risk payment doctrine and cash value insurance see Comment, supra
note 2, at 381-88.
In 1895 the Canadian province of Quebec, which has the community property sys-
tem, enacted a statute that required the risk payment rule to be applied to cash value
life insurance policies in certain situations. An Act respecting Life Insurance, 58 Vict.,
c. 46, § I (Que. 1895). The statute provided that when a husband insured his life in
favor of either his estate or his wife as beneficiary, if his wife predeceased him and "he
survives longer than the year covered by the last premium payment made during the
existence of the community," the community had a claim against the proceeds of the
policy equal only to the amount of the cash value at the date of the wife's death. Id.
A second provision provided that if, at the predeceasing wife's death, there was not
yet any cash value in the policy but the policy later acquired a cash value, "then the
husband or his estate shall account to the community only for the proportion repre-
sented by the premiums paid during the community." Id. Recently, the act in which
this section was contained was replaced. An Act respecting insurance, ch. 70, § 438,
[1974] Que. Stat. 683.
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amount of premium payments made from separate and community
funds89 or on the increase in the cash value as a result of subsequent
premium payments. 90
The labels term or cash value should actually make no difference in
the application of the risk payment doctrine because some term poli-
cies, such as level term to age 65, have cash value while some cash
value policies, such as recently issued policies or those against which
all the loan value has been borrowed, have no cash value.91 The im-
portant consideration is the actual composition of the policy proceeds
at the death of the insured, i.e., the portion of the proceeds attribut-
able to the cash value component and the portion attributable to the
protection element.
As has been discussed, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has ac-
cepted the risk payment doctrine for use with disability insurance and
has indicated that it would accept the same rule for use with term in-
surance. 92 Arizona and Texas courts have clearly adopted the risk
payment doctrine for use with term insurance. 93 The courts of all
three states have also accepted the concept that the community has a
fractional interest in the cash value of a policy on which premiums
have been paid with separate funds before marriage and community
funds afterwards. 94 These concepts could easily be combined to form
the risk payment doctrine for use with cash value policies. Presently
all three jurisdictions use the inception of title rule for cash value poli-
cies. 95
Idaho and New Mexico have most recently adopted the risk pay-
ment doctrine for use with term insurance. 96 The courts of these states
have not yet adopted a method for characterizing the cash value of a
89. Upon divorce, it has been held that the measure of separate and community
interests in a cash value life insurance policy is determined by apportioning the cash
value between the separate and community estates according to the amount of pre-
miums paid from each source. Pollock v. Pollock, 7 Wn. App. 394, 403, 499 P.2d 23 1,
237 (1972); Berdoll v. Berdoll, 145 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940. writ dism'd).
90. Upon death and divorce, the measure of the community interest in a separate
policy has been held to be the increase in the cash value of the policy resulting from
payments made with community funds. T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332 So. 2d
834, 847 (La. 1975) (death); Connell v. Connell, 331 So. 2d 4, 6-7 (La. 1976)
(divorce); Blaine v. Blaine, 63 Ariz. 100, 159 P.2d 786, 790 (1945) (divorce).
91. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Comment, supra note 2, at
382-84.
92. See Part I-A supra.
93. See Parts II-B & 11-C supra.
94. See notes 89 & 90 supra.
95. See notes 13, 38, 41, & 49 and accompanying text supra.
96. See Parts II-D & II-E supra.
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policy when both separate and community funds have made premium
payments. The cash value could be characterized as separate and
community in proportion to the amount of premiums paid from each
source. This is the method used by the courts of Washington and
Texas,97 and is similar to the manner in which Idaho and New
Mexico courts characterize military retirement benefits.98 It is also
possible that the courts would accept the Louisiana and Arizona rule99
of determining the community interest in a separate policy by the in-
crease in the policy's cash value resulting from payments made from
community funds.
Regardless of the precise manner in which the Idaho Supreme Court
would split the cash value between, the separate and community es-
tates, however, there is no precedent hindering the immediate use of
the risk payment doctrine for cash value insurance in Idaho as there is
in Louisiana, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. This is because the
Idaho Supreme Court has not yet faced the problem of separate and
community interests in a cash value life insurance policy when both
separate and community funds have paid premiums on such a policy.
In fact, the reasoning and the holding in the Johnson case in which
Idaho accepted the risk payment doctrine for use with term insurance
may mandate the use of the risk payment doctrine with cash value
insurance. 100
IV. TRANSFER TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE RISK
PAYMENT DOCTRINE
A. The Death of the Insured Spouse Before the Noninsured Spouse
When an insured person dies leaving a surviving spouse, the use of
the risk payment doctrine could result in a federal tax liability greater
than, equal to, or less than the tax liability under the inception of title
97. See note 89 supra.
98. Military retirement benefits in Idaho and New Mexico are characterized as sep-
arate and community in proportion to the number of years of service prior to marriage
(or after marriage but domiciled in a common law jurisdiction) and the number of
years of service after marriage while domiciled in a community property jurisdiction.
See Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96 Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975); Otto v. Otto, 80 N.M.
331, 455 P.2d 642 (1969); LeClert v. LeClert, 80 N.M. 235, 453 P.2d 755 (1969).
99. See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
100. For an analysis of the possibility of applying the risk payment doctrine to
cash value policies in the remaining community property jurisdictions, see Comment,
supra note 2, at 384-5.
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or apportionment rules. There may be an increased tax burden under
the application of the risk payment doctrine when the following con-
ditions exist: (1) the insured is married at death; (2) policy premiums
on insurance payable at the insured's death were begun before the
current marriage or after the current marriage but before moving into
a community property jurisdiction; 01 (3) the policy beneficiary is nei-
ther the surviving spouse nor the insured's estate, but a third party;
and (4) the insured's estate includes property other than life insurance
and the insured spouse's interest in such property passes to the sur-
viving spouse.
As an example,102 assume that a person paid premiums on a
$100,000 term life insurance policy for five years prior to marriage
from separate funds and for 15 years after marriage from community
funds. He then died in 1976, survived by a spouse and a child. In ad-
dition to the life insurance, the decedent owned only community prop-
erty valued, for federal estate tax purposes, at $100,000. The child
was the beneficiary of the insurance policy and the surviving spouse
was entitled to receive all of the decedent's interest in the other com-
munity property. The federal estate and gift taxes payable by reason of
his death prior to 1977 are shown in the table on the opposite page.
The example indicates that when the beneficiary of the insurance
policy is a third party, the estate tax advantage offered by the risk
payment doctrine may be no greater than that available through the
use of the marital deduction under either the inception of title or the
apportionment rule. The risk payment doctrine may even result in a
total tax burden greater than that under either of the other rules; be-
101. Property acquired by a spouse as his or her separate property while the cou-
ple is domiciled in a common law jurisdiction is classified as that spouse's separate
property when the couple moves to a community property jurisdiction. W. DEFUNIAK
& M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 91, at 223 (2d ed. 1971); H.
MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 225-39 (1952). Thus, post-marriage
premium payments made while the couple is living in a common law state are treated
in the same manner as are pre-marriage premium payments made by an individual in
a community property state. For federal estate tax purposes, California's quasi-com-
munity property statute, CAL. PROB. CODE § 201.5 (West 1956), does not alter the
tax treatment of quasi-community property as the acquiring spouse's separate property.
102. Although recent modifications of the federal estate and gift tax law have raised
the amount of the marital deduction and have, in effect, increased the estate tax ex-
emption for decedents who die after December 31, 1976, the principles illustrated in
the examples remain valid. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, Tit. XX
(Oct. 4, 1976). It can also be expected that pre-1977 federal estate tax law affecting
life insurance will continue to be litigated in the appellate courts for the next decade.
Finally, the examples may be useful in illustrating a result that may be analogous
under state estate, inheritance and gift tax laws.
Vol. 52: 67, 1976
Community Property Life Insurance
Inception of Apportionment Risk payment








be owned by wife (50,000) (50,000) (50,000)
Marital deduction 104  (50,000) (12,500)
Portion of insurance
proceeds deemed to
owned by wife10 5  (37,500) (50,000)
Exemption (60,000) (60,000) (60,000)
Taxable estate $ 40,000106 $ 40,000 $ 40,000
Gift tax' 07  - $ 101.25 $ 952.50
Estate tax $ 4,800 4,800 4,800
Total tax $ 4,800 $ 4,901.25 $ 5,752.50
103. This example follows the apportionment rule as adopted in California,
whereby a spouse may dispose of his or her half interest in community life insurance
proceeds through a beneficiary designation. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy,
60 Cal. App. 602, 214 P. 61 (1923). In Washington, the other state that has adopted
the apportionment theory, however, an insured spouse cannot validly designate a
beneficiary other than his wife or his estate without his wife's consent. Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937); In re Towey's Estate, 22 Wn.
2d 212, 155 P.2d 273 (1945). Thus the example in the text is applicable to Washing-
ton decedents only if the deceased spouse's estate is the beneficiary of the life insurance
policy and if the decedent's will directs that at least half ot the community interest in
the policy proceeds go to one other than his spouse.
104. The amount of the pre-1977 marital deduction is the lesser of (1) the amount
of property passing to the surviving spouse which qualifies for the marital deduction,
or (2) one-half the adjusted gross estate. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(a), (c)(1).
In this example the amount of qualifying property passing to the surviving spouse is
$50,000, which is the deceased husband's interest in the community property. The ad-
justed gross estate is the husband's gross estate minus the sum of the amount of com-
munity property in which he had an interest and a proportion of § 2053 and § 2054
deductions ($0 in the example). Thus, the adjusted gross estate in this instance is the
amount of separate property owned by the husband at death, or $100,000, $25,000
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cause the risk payment doctrine results in the greatest amount of in-
surance proceeds being characterized as owned by the surviving
spouse, the gift tax liability of the surviving spouse for proceeds
passing to other beneficiaries will be the greatest.
The negative tax effect of the risk payment doctrine is ameliorated,
however, by two additional factors. First, if the payment of the sur-
viving spouse's share of insurance proceeds to the third party is void-
able,1 08 then she can claim the proceeds herself and thereby eliminate
any gift tax liability. Alternatively, she could void the transfer for the
and $0 under the inception of title, apportionment and risk payment rules respectively.
105. If a cash value policy were involved, the portion of insurance proceeds
deemed to be owned by the wife would be a combination of one-half the protection
portion of the policy plus one-half of the community interest in the cash value.
106. A deduction from the insured's gross estate may be allowed for the commu-
nity's claim of premium payments it made on the insured's separate policy. Under the
facts of this example, however, the taxable estate would remain unchanged. This is so
because the marital deduction, which would be reduced in the amount of one-half the
community claim, would be exactly offset by the deduction from the gross estate for
the debt to the surviving spouse of one-half the total community claim.
Whether the community claim may in all cases be deducted from the gross estate is
not yet settled. The position of the Internal Revenue Service is that the deduction of
the claim against the insured's estate for reimbursement of premiums paid from com-
munity funds should be allowed only if the claim is presented to and actually paid by
the insured's estate. Rev. Rul. 232, 1953-2 CUM. BULL. 268, 272 Example (E). The
Tax Court, however, has held that when the surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary,
the claim need not be actually presented to and paid by the insured's estate in order
to be deductible. Estate of Bryan Wildenthal, 29 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 519 (1970).
The amount of the community claim is determined by state law. Such claim was
formerly the reimbursement of premiums paid from community funds. See Rev. Rul.
232 supra. Recently, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that such a reimburse-
ment of premiums is incorrect and the correct principle is that the community should
be reimbursed in an amount equal to the increase in the policy's cash value during
the time the community was paying premiums. T.L. James & Co. v. Montgomery, 332
So. 2d 834, 847 (La. 1975). Thus there would be no reimbursement available in
Louisiana where community funds have paid premiums on a separately-owned term
policy. In a cash value policy the increase in cash value by reason of community pre-
mium payments may be, depending on the circumstances, greater or lesser than the
former measure of the amount of premiums paid from community funds.
107. Any portion of community property proceeds deemed to be owned by the
surviving spouse which is received by a third party as beneficiary is subject to gift tax-
ation. Treas. Reg. 25.2511-1(h)(9) (1958); Rev. Rul. 232, 1953-2 CuM. BULL. 268,
270-72 Examples (A)(1) & (D)(1) (Louisiana law); Rev. Rul. 48, 1948, 1953-1
CuM. BULL. 392 (Texas and Louisiana law). In this example, it is assumed that the
$3,000 annual exclusion and the pre-1977 $30,000 lifetime exemption are fully avail-
able. See note 109 infra.
108. For a summary of the laws in the various community property jurisdictions
relating to the ability of the wife to set aside the beneficiary designation of a commu-
nity life insurance policy see notes 23, 40, 43 & 103 supra (Louisiana, Texas, Arizona,
California and Washington), notes 60, 61 & 74 and accompanying text supra (Idaho
and New Mexico), and Christensen v. Christensen, 530 P.2d 754 (Nev. 1975)
(Nevada). See generally Travelers Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 97 Idaho 336, 544 P.2d 294.
297-98 (1975); W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §
123 (2d ed. 1971).
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amount in excess of the applicable gift tax exemption and exclusions
and during the following years give additional amounts (up to her
annual exclusion of $3,000 per donee) until the entire amount of the
surviving spouse's half interest in the policy proceeds had been given
to the beneficiary. 10 9 Second, if the gift is not voided and the benefi-
ciary does receive all the policy proceeds, only the amount in excess
of the annual $3,000 per donee gift tax exclusion and the available
amount of the surviving spouse's lifetime exemption will be subject to
gift tax. 110
There are situations, however, in which the application of the risk
payment doctrine will save taxes. If the following conditions are met
the tax burden at the decedent's death may be less when the risk pay-
ment doctrine is used than when either of the alternative theories is
employed: (1) the insured is married at death; (2) policy premiums on
insurance payable at the insured's death were begun before the cur-
rent marriage or after the current marriage but before moving into a
community property jurisdiction;"' (3) the policy beneficiary is nei-
ther the surviving spouse nor the insured's estate, but a third party;
and (4) the amount of life insurance payable on the insured's death
and included in his gross estate is greater than his non-insurance as-
sets.
As an example, assume that a person obtained a $100,000 group
term life insurance policy when he began employment and worked for
his employer for four years while single and one year while married.
He then died in 1976, survived by his wife and his mother. In addition
to his life insurance, there was other separate property valued at
109. The annual gift tax exclusidn allows an individual to make gifts of $3,000 or
less per donee without incurring gift tax liability. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b).
In addition, under pre-1977 law each individual is allowed a lifetime exemption of
$30,000 which may be applied against gifts in excess of $3,000 per donee per year.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2521. Thus, it would be possible for the surviving spouse
to pay no gift tax if she voided the transfer of her portion of the proceeds to the bene-
ficiary and then gave the beneficiary $33,000 at once, followed by $3,000 per year until
the entire amount of the surviving spouse's half of the policy proceeds had been given
to the beneficiary. If there were more than one beneficiary, the maximum amount of
a gift which would be exempt from gift tax during the first year would be, in addition
to the $30,000 lifetime exclusion, $3,000 per beneficiary. In each succeeding year the
surviving spouse could give $3,000 to each beneficiary without incurring gift tax liabil-
ity. Effective January 1, 1977, a unified estate and gift tax credit replaced the $30,000
gift tax exemption. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001 (Oct. 4,
1976).
110. Thus, under pre-1977 law, if there were four beneficiaries the total excluded
from the amount of the taxable gift would be $42,000. See note 109 supra.
111. See note 101 supra.
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$20,000 and community property valued at $10,000. The decedent's
mother was the beneficiary of the insurance policy and his surviving
spouse was entitled to receive all of his other property. A summary of
the calculations of the decedent's taxable estate and the total federal
estate and gift tax burden under the various doctrines is as follows:
Inception of Apportionment Risk payment








be owned by wife (5,000) (5,000) (5,000)
Marital deduction 113  (25,000) (25,000) (10,000)
Portion of insurance
proceeds deemed to
be owned by wife1 14  (10,000) (50,000)
Exemption (60,000) (60,000) (60,000)
Taxable estate $ 40,000115 $ 30,000 $ 5,000
Gift tax1 16  - - $ 952.50
Estate tax $ 4,800 $ 3,000 $ 150.00
Total tax $ 4,800 $ 3,000 $ 1,102.50
112. See note 103 supra.
113. See note 104 supra for the definition and formula for calculation of the mari-
tal deduction. In this example, the amount of qualifying property passing to the sur-
viving spouse is $25.000. which consists of $20,000 of separate property and $5,000 of
the husband's interest in community property. The amount of the adjusted gross estate
is the total amount of the husband's separate property, which is $120,000, $100.000
and $20,000 under the inception of title, apportionment and risk payment rules re-
spectively.
114. See note 105 supra.
115. See note 106 supra.
116. See note 107 supra.
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Under these circumstances, the risk payment doctrine results in the
smallest taxable estate and lowest total tax liability. Although there is
a taxable *gift from the wife if the beneficiary receives the portion of
the proceeds deemed to be owned by the wife, the total federal estate
and gift tax burden under the risk payment doctrine is still signifi-
cantly less than the federal estate tax under either of the other two
rules.117 Furthermore, the gift tax liability can be entirely eliminated
by spreading the distribution of the surviving spouse's portion of the
proceeds over several years. 118
In the first example above, if the beneficiary of the policy were the
surviving spouse rather than a third party, then there would be no dif-
ference among the tax results of the inception of title, apportionment
and risk payment rules because there would be no gift tax. In the
second example, an additional reason for there being no difference is
the increase in the marital deduction 1 9 resulting from the receipt of
the proceeds by the surviving spouse. In both examples, if the benefi-
ciary were the insured's estate, whether there would be any difference
among the tax consequences of the three rules would depend on how
much of the estate passed to the surviving spouse and whether the sur-
viving spouse claimed her one-half interest in community insurance
proceeds.
B. The Death of the Insured Spouse After the Noninsured
Spouse'20
The risk payment doctrine is also applicable to federal estate tax
problems concerning the amount of community-owned life insurance
117. This is so for two reasons. First, the pre-1977 gift tax rates were three-fourths
the estate tax rates. Second, the amount of taxable gift in this example ($17,000) is
significantly less than the difference between the total taxable estate calculated under
the risk payment doctrine and that calculated under either of the other two rules.
118. See note 109 and accompanying text supra.
119. The pre-1977 marital deduction would be increased to $60,000 under the in-
ception of title rule, $50,000 under the apportionment rule, and would remain the
same under the risk payment rule. For the definition and formula for calculation of
the marital deduction, see note 104 supra. The amount of qualifying property passing
to the surviving spouse under the inception of title rule would be $125,000 and the
adjusted gross estate would be $120,000. Under the apportionment rule the amount of
qualifying property passing to the surviving spouse would be $115,000 and the adjusted
gross estate would be $100,000. Under the risk payment doctrine the amount of qual-
ifying property passing to the surviving spouse would be $75,000 but the adjusted
gross estate would remain at $20,000.
120. An analogous situation is when an insured ex-spouse dies after divorce and
the policy was not included in the divorce decree.
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proceeds that should be included in the gross estate of an insured
spouse who dies after the noninsured spouse. 12' Because the succes-
sors in interest of the noninsured spouse receive a one-half ownership
in the term policy upon that spouse's death, that interest should be
treated as a life insurance policy of half the size. 122 If so treated, the
noninsured spouse's successors must contribute premiums in order to
keep their one-half of the policy in force. If they do so and the sur-
viving spouse also continues to contribute premiums, then, upon death
of the surviving spouse, one-half the proceeds will be characterized as
owned by the successors and one-half by the surviving spouse.123
If the successors in interest of the deceased noninsured spouse do
not contribute one-half of the premiums necessary to keep the policy
in force, their half of the policy should be treated as having lapsed.
The interest of the surviving spouse, who is then required to pay all
subsequent premiums himself, would be the full face amount of the
policy. The entire proceeds of the term insurance policy would then
be includable in his gross estate at his death. 124 Alternatively, if the
successors of the deceased spouse had been precluded from paying
half of the premiums by a wrongful act of the surviving spouse, their
recovery should be one-half of the policy's face value less one-half of
the premiums paid by the surviving spouse until his or her death. Or
instead of using the above rules, the court could, regardless of the in-
tent of the successors in interest or of the wrongful acts of the sur-
viving spouse, limit the recovery of the noninsured spouse's successors
121. This discussion is not affected by the recent changes in the federal estate and
gift tax law. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, Tit. XX (Oct. 4. 1976).
Although it can be expected that the frequency of the problem herein discussed will be
lessened because of the higher exemptions under the new law, it can also be expected
that the litigated battles will be hard fought because the marginal tax rate on the pro-
ceeds subjected to taxation will be at least 30%. Id. at § 2001.
122. If requested, an insurance company will actually divide one policy into two,
each with one-half the face amount of the original. See Thurman, Federal Estate and
Gift Taxation of Community Property, I ARIz. L. REV. 253, 273 (1959).
123. If, however, the premium payments by the noninsured spouse's successors are
deemed to be gifts to the surviving spouse, then the entire proceeds would be includ-
able in the surviving spouse's gross estate at his death. This is because all premium
payments subsequent to the death of the noninsured spouse would then be deemed to
be from the surviving spouse's separate funds. In Scott v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 154.
161 (9th Cir. 1962), premium payments made by the pre-deceasing noninsured spouse's
legatees on community cash value policies were characterized by the Commissioner as
loans to the surviving spouse. Such characterization apparently was not resisted by the
taxpayer. Id.
124. If, however, the premium payments by the surviving spouse are deemed to be
gifts to the noninsured spouse's successors, then only one-half of the proceeds will be
includable in the surviving spouse's gross estate at his death.
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to one-half the face value less half the premiums subsequently paid by
the insured surviving spouse. Such premium amounts should be cumu-
lated at a reasonable rate of interest, such as nine or ten percent. This
rule would treat the premium payment by the surviving spouse as a
loan to the successors of the predeceasing noninsured spouse, yet rec-
ognize that each premium payment pays for the life insurance protec-
tion for a limited length of time.
If a cash value policy is involved, only a minor modification in the
above rules is necessary. If the successors in interest of the noninsured
spouse do not contribute one-half of the premiums necessary to keep
the policy in force, and their half is treated as having lapsed, the suc-
cessors should be entitled to one-half the former community interest in
the policy's cash value. Thus the policy's face value less the interest of
the deceased spouse's successors, which would be one-half the interpo-
lated terminal reserve value of the .policy at the death of the first
spouse, is the amount that would be characterized as the insured's
separate property and included in his gross estate at his death.
Revenue Ruling 75-100 and Scott v. Commissioner
There has been one revenue ruling, Revenue Ruling 75-100,125
and one case, Scott v. Commissioner,12 6 concerning the extent of the
insured spouse's interest in the policy proceeds when the insured
spouse survives the noninsured spouse. The facts in the revenue ruling
and Scott differ in that in the former, the insured spouse's death oc-
curred shortly after the noninsured spouse's death. In the latter, the
insured spouse's death occurred over a year after the death of the non-
insured spouse. In Revenue Ruling 75-100, the husband and wife,
both residents of Texas, owned a community property ordinary (cash
value) life insurance policy on the husband's life which designated
their children as beneficiaries. The wife predeceased her husband by
ten days. Her estate was bequeathed to the children and there was no
settlement of her interest in the policy prior to the husband's death.
The Internal Revenue Service determined that the amount includable
in the husband's gross estate was one-half the value of the proceeds.
The amount includable in the wife's gross estate was one-half the
125. 1975-1 CuM. BULL. 303.
126. 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
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value of the policy as determined by the terminal-reserve method
under Treasury Regulation § 20.2031-8(a)(2). 127 The result under
the risk payment doctrine would be the same under these facts and
under any set of facts in which the subsequent death of the insured
spouse occurred while the policy was still in effect and no premium
payments had been made subsequent to the noninsured spouse's
death.
In Scott v. Commissioner, the noninsured wife died in 1957,
passing her interest in ten community property life insurance policies,
which insured the husband's life, to two sons as her legatees. One-half
the value of the policies was included in her gross estate. Thirteen
months after the wife's death, the insured husband died. The sons, as
beneficiaries under the policies, received all the insurance proceeds.
During the 13 months between the wife's death and the husband's
death, the husband paid almost 41% of the premiums due on the pol-
icies and the sons paid over 59% of the premiums. Because it was
determined that the payment of the premiums by the sons was a gift to
the husband, all premiums paid after the wife's death were deemed
paid by the husband from his separate funds. The issue was how much
of the life insurance policy proceeds were includable in the decedent
husband's gross estate.
The Commissioner argued for the conclusion that the amount in-
cludable in the decedent's gross estate was the policies' total proceeds
minus one-half the cash surrender value128 of the policies at the wife's
death. He contended that the wife's only interest in the policies was
one-half the cash surrender value, and therefore all other policy
rights, including that to receive the proceeds, were owned by the de-
ceased husband. The Commissioner relied on the risk payment doc-
trine as applicable to cash value insurance to support this conten-
tion.12 9 The decedent's estate argued that, because the California ap-
127. The pertinent part of the regulation reads as follows:
[W] hen, at the date of the decedent's death, the contract has been in force for
some time and further premium payments are to be made, the value may be ap-
proximated by adding to the interpolated terminal reserve at the date of the dece-
dent's death the proportionate part of the gross premium last paid before the date
of the decedent's death which covers the period extending beyond that date.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(a)(2) (1958).
128. It was not until later that the value of the predeceasing noninsured spouse's
interest in such a policy was determined to be one-half the interpolated terminal re-
serve value rather than one-half the cash surrender value. Rev. Rul. 75-100, 1975-1
CuM. BULL. 303.
129. The court summarized the Commissioner's risk payment argument as follows:
100
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portionment rule required the proceeds of the ten policies to be char-
acterized as separate or community in proportion to the number of
premium payments made from each source, the amount includable in
the husband's gross estate was one-half the proceeds attributable to
community property payments and all of the proceeds attributable to
his separate property payments made after the wife's death. The court
of appeals reversed the Tax Court, 30 which had held for the Commis-
sioner, and accepted the reasoning and result argued by the decedent's
estate.
The major factor that the court relied on in accepting the taxpay-
er's view was that such view was consistent with the California appor-
tionment doctrine. 131 Presumably, if the risk payment doctrine had
been accepted by the state rather than the apportionment rule, then
the risk payment analysis proposed by the Commissioner would have
been accepted, 13 2 for the court relied on the proposition that "state
property rules control the estate taxation of community property life
insurance."133
V. CONCLUSION
Only the risk payment doctrine recognizes that life insurance is a
series of unilateral contracts and that it may consist of both temporary
and permanent elements. Because the risk payment doctrine is the
[T] he right to receive the face amount of the policies upon the husband's death
... is kept alive only by payment of further premiums by the husband after the
wife's death. Consequently to the extent that the proceeds receivable at the hus-
band's death exceed the cash surrender value at the wife's death, this is attributa-
ble to those premiums, which were not paid from community property, the mari-
tal community having been dissolved by the death of the wife.
374 F.2d at 159.
130. The Tax Court opinion is reported at 43 T.C. 920 (1965) and noted in Note,
64 MICH. L. REv. 1150 (1966).
131. See note 103 supra.
132. The court stated:
If the Commissioner's theory were correct, one would expect the courts to have
held that the entire proceeds of the policies, less the cash surrender value, if any,
at the date of the marriage, was community property, the husband's separate prop-
erty interest being limited to that cash surrender value. But the courts of California
have not so held.
374 F.2d at 159.
133. 374 F.2d at 157, quoting Thurman, supra note 8. Perhaps another factor that
contributed to the Commissioner's losing in Scott was that the government presented
the risk payment doctrine poorly. Although the court mentioned that the risk payment
doctrine was more fully developed by the government during oral argument, the Com-
missioner's 25-page brief only devoted one paragraph to it. See Brief for Respondent
at 20, Scott v. Commissioner, 374 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1967).
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only rule that treats life insurance as this unique type of property, it is
superior to both the inception of title and the apportionment rules. As
courts have become aware of the nature of life insurance they have
accepted the risk payment doctrine. During the past year alone, the
supreme courts of Idaho and New Mexico have applied it to term in-
surance. It is predicted that in the future its acceptance by state courts
will continue. It should also be remembered that not only have the
state community property laws of Louisiana, Texas, Idaho, Arizona,
and New Mexico been affected by the acceptance of the risk payment
doctrine, but that the impact of the federal and state estate, inherit-
ance and gift tax laws in those jurisdictions has been modified as well.
James M. Higbee*
* Fourth-year J.D./M.B.A. student, University of Washington; B.S., 1973, Brigham
Young University.
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